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Social scientists have devoted a great deal of attention to understanding the eﬀects of educa-
tional attainment on a range of outcomes. These eﬀects are a large factor in many policy decisions,
such as whether to subsidize education programs for GED certiﬁcation (Cameron and Heckman
(1993)), how much to invest in preventing students from dropping out of school (Dearden et al.
(2009), Oreopoulos (2007)), and setting the age at which children should be eligible to enter school
(Aliprantis (2010)) and the labor market (Deming and Dynarski (2008)). More generally, it is
important to understand the eﬀects of education when designing a range of interventions to im-
prove outcomes, especially those focusing on health (McCrary and Royer (2009)), early childhood
interventions (Heckman et al. (2010)), labor market skills (Heckman et al. (1999)), earnings (Card
(1999)), and housing (Sanbonmatsu et al. (2006)). However, since educational attainment is chosen
endogenously by individuals, it is diﬃcult to identify its causal eﬀects (Card (2001)).
One widely used approach to identifying causal eﬀects of educational attainment uses quarter
of birth as an instrument for educational attainment, a literature that began with the seminal work
of Angrist and Krueger (1991). This identiﬁcation strategy uses the naturally occurring variation
in birth dates together with schools’ entrance cutoﬀ dates to assign diﬀerent levels of education
to children of the same age. This framework has since been used in many settings, but in its
original setting it is combined with compulsory schooling laws that prohibit students from dropping
out of school before a speciﬁc age. Since these compulsory schooling laws apply to students’
ages, otherwise similar children are legally able to withdraw from school with diﬀering levels of
educational attainment. The crucial identifying assumption of monotonicity in this framework is
that quarter or date of birth aﬀects all children’s educational attainment in the same way.
The contribution of this paper is to show that parents delaying their children’s initial enrollment
in kindergarten, a practice known as redshirting, makes it all but impossible to interpret estimates
of the eﬀects of educational attainment when date or quarter of birth is used as an instrument for
educational attainment. Theoretical evidence is presented that redshirting creates violations of the
monotonicity assumption necessary to identify many of the causal eﬀects of educational attainment
estimated in the literature. The paper also presents empirical evidence from the Early Childhood
Longitudinal Study, Kindergarten Class of 1998-99 (ECLS-K) data set indicating not only that
redshirting is common, but that heterogeneity in the treatment eﬀect of educational attainment
is likely a factor in parents’ redshirting decisions. The paper discusses in detail exactly how the
interpretation of the estimator breaks down when this evidence is considered. Despite previous
scrutiny that has already been given to this identiﬁcation strategy, date of birth has been and
continues to be used as an instrument for the Local Average Treatment Eﬀect (LATE) or Average
Causal Response (ACR) of educational attainment in a wide variety of applications.1 The novelty
of this paper is to highlight the distinct methodological problem redshirting creates when date of
birth is used as an instrument for educational attainment, an important factor when considering
1Such scrutiny has focused on the non-random nature of birth date (Bound and Jaeger (2000)), as well as the
weak correlation between date of birth and educational attainment (Bound et al. (1995), Cruz and Moreira (2005)).
2the results from this literature.2
The result presented in this paper is pertinent to the wider discussions about the role of theory
in empirical microeconomics (Keane (2010), Heckman (2010), Imbens (2010)), and is especially
relevant to discussions about the interpretation of estimates generated by natural experiments
(Rosenzweig and Wolpin (2000)). One line of research on these topics by Heckman and coauthors
(Heckman et al. (2006), Heckman and Urz´ ua (2010)) emphasizes that while recent developments
in the instrumental variables (IV) literature allow for responses to treatment to be heterogeneous,
the monotonicity assumption in these models restricts the choice into treatment from being simi-
larly heterogeneous. The way parents choose to redshirt their children violates this assumption, a
scenario Heckman et al. (2006) refer to as essential heterogeneity. This example accentuates the
importance of understanding the relationship between the Rubin Causal Model developed in the
Statistics literature and the Roy Model developed in the Economics literature (Heckman (2005),
Sobel (2005)).
The paper is organized as follows: Sections 2 and 3 discuss the identifying assumptions of several
causal treatment eﬀects within a canonical framework. Section 4 presents the popular application
of this framework using date of birth as an instrument for educational attainment to obtain causal
eﬀects of schooling. Section 4 also demonstrates how redshirting violates the identifying assumption
of monotonicity, and Section 5 examines data from the ECLS-K data set illustrating the empirical
magnitude of this problem. Section 6 goes into detail about how the interpretation of estimates
obtained by this identiﬁcation scheme is aﬀected by redshirting, and this Section also presents a
very brief overview of the literature aﬀected by this issue. Section 7 concludes.
2 Identifying Treatment Eﬀects Using Randomization
2.1 The Average Treatment Eﬀect (ATE)
Consider a standard framework for studying causal treatment eﬀects (Holland (1986), Rubin
(1974)). Let Yi(1) and Yi(0) be random variables associated with the potential outcomes in the
treated and untreated states, respectively, for individual i. Di is a random variable indicating





1 if treatment is received;
0 if treatment is not received.
The measured outcome variable Yi is
Yi = DiYi(1) + (1 − Di)Yi(0).
2After completing an initial draft of this paper, the author became aware that a similar result was independently
reported in Barua and Lang (2009).
3Since both treatment states are not observable for any individual i, inference cannot be drawn about
the value of Yi(1)−Yi(0). However, causal inference can be made under speciﬁc assumptions. One
such assumption that allows for inference about average eﬀects on a population, which Holland
(1986) calls independence, is that:
E[Yi(1)] = E[Yi(1)|Di = 1]
E[Yi(0)] = E[Yi(0)|Di = 0].
This assumption is typically operationalized by the researcher’s random assignment of individuals










as an unbiased estimator of the Average Treatment Eﬀect (ATE):
E[Yi(1) − Yi(0)].
3 Identifying Treatment Eﬀects Using Instrumental Variables
When the researcher does not control the assignment of individuals to treatment groups, and
therefore is not assured of independence, one strategy for identifying treatment eﬀects is to search
for an instrumental variable. Deﬁne Di(z) to be the treatment of individual i with variable Zi
equal to z. A variable Zi is an instrument for Di if Assumption 1 holds:
1-i: Yi(0), Yi(1), and Di(z) are jointly independent of Zi
1-ii: Zi is correlated with Di
Comparing the outcome variable Yi at two diﬀerent values of the instrument, z and w, under
Assumption 1, we have:3
E[Y |Z = z] − E[Y |Z = w]
= E[D(z)Y (1) + (1 − D(z))Y (0)|Z = z] − E[D(w)Y (1) + (1 − D(w))Y (0)|Z = w]
= E[(D(z) − D(w))(Y (1) − Y (0))] (1)
= Pr[D(z) − D(w) = 1]E[Y (1) − Y (0)|D(z) − D(w) = 1]
− Pr[D(z) − D(w) = −1]E[Y (1) − Y (0)|D(z) − D(w) = −1]. (2)
Note that Equation 1 follows due to Assumption 1-i, and that Equation 2 in its present form
represents a comparison of average outcomes between those individuals who “switch-in” and those
3For the sake of exposition individual subscripts i are dropped at this point. It is understood that expectations
are taken over the population of individuals.
4who “switch-out” of treatment due to changes in the instrument. Much of the ensuing discussion of
instrumental variables is focused on ensuring that Equation 2 identiﬁes a treatment eﬀect of interest
by placing restrictions on how changes in the instrument induce changes in treatment. Imbens and
Angrist (1994) and Angrist and Imbens (1995) discuss and develop several assumptions that allow
for the identiﬁcation of treatment eﬀects when combined with Assumption 1.
3.1 Constant Treatment Eﬀect
Consider a version of Assumption 2 where the researcher assumes a constant treatment eﬀect:
Assumption 2a: β = Yi(1) − Yi(0) for all individuals i in the population.
When Assumption 1 and 2a hold, β is identiﬁed, as Equation 2 becomes:
E[Y |Z = z] − E[Y |Z = w] = β E[D(z) − D(w)]. (3)
3.2 The Average Treatment Eﬀect for the Treated (ATT)
A researcher might also have reason to believe that there is some value of the instrument,
Z = w, for which no individual receives treatment. That is:
Assumption 2b: There exists Z = w such that E[D|Z = w] = 0.
In this case, Equation 2 becomes:
E[Y |Z = z] − E[Y |Z = w] = Pr[D(z) = 1]E[Y (1) − Y (0)|D(z) = 1],
allowing us to identify what Imbens and Angrist (1994) call the Average Treatment eﬀect for the
Treated (ATT) parameter:
E[Y (1) − Y (0)|D(z) = 1].
3.3 The Local Average Treatment Eﬀect (LATE)
A ﬁnal approach, originally proposed in Imbens and Angrist (1994), is to make a monotonicity
assumption. The assumption of monotonicity is that if the instrument induces changes in treat-
ment, these changes must be the same for all individuals. This assumption allows for treatment
eﬀect heterogeneity, and also allows for some individuals to receive treatment at all values of the
instrument. Under the assumption of monotonicity, all of the individuals aﬀected by the instrument
are either caused to “switch-in” or else to “switch-out” of treatment. Speciﬁcally:
Assumption 2c: For all possible values of z and w, either Di(z) ≥ Di(w) for all i, or else Di(z) ≤
Di(w) for all i.
5Deﬁne the Local Average Treatment Eﬀect (LATE) to be the average causal eﬀect of treatment for
those whose treatment status is aﬀected by the instrument. If D(z) ≥ D(w), then the second term
in Equation 2 is 0.4 Thus Equation 2 becomes
E[Y |Z = z] − E[Y |Z = w]
= Pr[D(z) − D(w) = 1]E[Y (1) − Y (0)|D(z) − D(w) = 1],
allowing us to identify the LATE:
βLATE = E[Y (1) − Y (0)|D(z) − D(w) = 1]. (4)
Vytlacil (2002) establishes equivalent identifying assumptions for a latent index model, and Blun-
dell and Dias (2009) discuss what precisely the LATE measures. The LATE may be thought of
as a type of instrument-speciﬁc ATT eﬀect, as it measures the eﬀect on outcomes for the sub-
population of individuals induced to change their treatment status due to a change in the speciﬁc
instrument Z. Blundell and Dias (2009) note not only that this subpopulation of “movers” need
not be representative of the whole population, but that it need not even be the same for diﬀerent
instruments.
3.4 Multiple Treatments and the Average Causal Response (ACR)
Now consider a scenario in which the instrumental variable is still dichotomous, but individuals
may receive three treatment intensities:
D =

   




Angrist and Imbens (1995) develop an extension of the LATE in which Assumption 1-i becomes:
1-i: Y (0), Y (1), Y (2), and D(z) are jointly independent of Z,
while Assumption 2 is the same as necessary to identify the LATE (ie, 2c). Angrist and Imbens
(1995) proved that if Assumptions 1 and 2 are true, and Pr(D(1) ≥ j > D(0)) > 0 for at least one
j ∈ {0,1,2}, then it is possible to identify a weighted average of treatment eﬀects, which they call
the Average Causal Response (ACR):
βACR =
E[Y |Z = 1] − E[Y |Z = 0]




ωjE[Y j − Y j−1|D(1) ≥ j > D(0)].
4The case where D(z) ≤ D(w) is analogous.
64 Date of Birth as an Instrument for Educational Attainment
We now consider the widely used application of the LATE and ACR that is the focus of this
paper: using date of birth to identify causal eﬀects of educational attainment. In the United States,
children are eligible to begin kindergarten if they turn 5 before a speciﬁc entrance cutoﬀ date. To
continue with the previous framework in which the instrumental variable is dichotomous, consider
only those children born in the quarter before (Qb) or the quarter after (Qa) the entrance cutoﬀ
date. Our instrument Z is a binary variable which takes value 1 if a child is eligible to enroll, and





1 if child i is born in Qb,
0 if child i is born in Qa.
Consider the group of children ﬁrst entering kindergarten in the fall of 1998, and deﬁne treatment
to be educational attainment at age 6.5 This group is displayed in Figure 1. Note that some of
these children were eligible to enroll in the fall of 1997, but were redshirted. That is, their initial
enrollment in kindergarten was delayed by one year. As well, notice that a similar group of children
eligible to enroll in the fall of 1998 will wait until the fall of 1999 to enroll in kindergarten for the
ﬁrst time. Evidence will be presented in Section 5 that this phenomenon is not prevalent among
children in Qa, as very few children in that group delay their enrollment. Evidence will also be
presented in Section 5 that very few children in Qa enroll before they are ﬁrst eligible. Thus our
model will assume that no children in Qa enroll before they are ﬁrst eligible, and that no children
in Qa delay their enrollment. Under these assumptions, just as in the model in Section 3.4, there
are three levels of treatment:
Di =

   
   
−1 if born in Qb and redshirted,
0 if born in Qa,
1 if born in Qb and enrolled when ﬁrst eligible.
The three levels of treatment intensity are necessary to allow for the possibility that the mono-
tonicity assumption is violated. As discussed in Angrist and Imbens (1995), it is only when there
are multiple treatment intensities that the monotonicity assumption has testable implications.6 We
further assume that children in each quarter all receive the same schooling as the youngest child
born in the same quarter. These assumptions are displayed in Figure 1.
Further assume there exists a latent index:
D∗
i = Ziγ1 (5)
5Note that analogous arguments hold if we deﬁne treatment to be attainment at a later age, or even (relative)
age at testing date.
6This testable implication is that the CDFs of educational attainment given Z=1 and Z=0 should not cross, and
is examined in Section 5.
7and that treatment status depends on quarter of birth through this latent index as follows:
Di =

   








Heterogeneity is introduced into the model by assuming there are two types of children, τ ∈





2 } , as well as the possibility that there is heterogeneity in how the instrument Z aﬀects
one’s latent index, γH
1 and γL







1 if τ = H,
ZiγL
1 if τ = L,
(7)





β0 + 1{Di = −1}βH
1 + 1{Di = 1}βH
2 + ǫi if τ = H,
β0 + 1{Di = −1}βL
1 + 1{Di = 1}βL
2 + ǫi if τ = L.
Figure 1 helps to clarify that β1 is the eﬀect of receiving 0.25 years less schooling at a given age
and β2 is the eﬀect of receiving 0.75 years more schooling at a given age.
4.1 Heterogeneous Treatment Eﬀects Satisfying the Monotonicity Assumption
The assumption of monotonicity is that those individuals aﬀected by the instrument must all
be aﬀected in the same way. In terms of our model, this assumption is that either γH
1 = γL
1 , or else
one of γH
1 or γL
1 is equal to 0. One example satisfying the assumption of monotonicity is where
γH
1 = γL
1 = 1. In this case, all parents enroll their children when ﬁrst eligible. Let S1 be educational
attainment on a child’s sixth birthday for those with z = 1, and S0 be educational attainment for
those with z = 0. Changing the instrument from 0 to 1 induces all children to “switch-in” to the
treatment of receiving 0.75 years of extra schooling at a given age (D∗(0) = 0 and D∗(1) = 1 for
both τ = H and τ = L, which implies from the latent index in Equation 6 that D(0) = 0 and
D(1) = 1 for both τ = H and τ = L.). Note that since all children enroll when ﬁrst eligible, in this
case Pr[D(z) − D(w) = 1] = 1. Thus the comparison of outcomes by treatment status is actually
8the LATE from Equation 4, a weighted average of the heterogeneous treatment eﬀects βH
2 and βL
2 :
E[Yi|z = 1] − E[Yi|z = 0] = Pr(τ = H)E[Y H
i |SH





Pr(τ = H)E[Y H
i |S0] + Pr(τ = L)E[Y L
i |S0]
 
= Pr(τ = H)
 
E[Y H
i |S0 + 0.75] − E[Y H
i |S0]
 
+ Pr(τ = L)
 
E[Y L
i |S0 + 0.75] − E[Y L
i |S0]
 
= Pr(τ = H)βH
2 + Pr(τ = L)βL
2 .
It is also of interest that since children will receive one of only two treatments (D ∈ {0,1}), the
comparison of outcomes by treatment status in this case will yield the same parameter for the
ACR as well as the LATE. Under the assumptions presented here, comparing average outcomes by
instrument status allows for the identiﬁcation of causal treatment eﬀects of educational attainment.
4.2 Heterogeneous Treatment Eﬀects Violating the Monotonicity Assumption:
The Case of Redshirting
Parents and schools often choose to redshirt children, or to delay their initial enrollment in
kindergarten. Thus it is more realistic to consider a model in which the parents of type H children
redshirt their children, while children of type L are redshirted. This may be captured in the context
of our model by letting γH
1 = 1 and γL
1 = −1.
Redshirting creates violations of the monotonicity assumption, Assumption 2c. When γH
1 = 1
and γL
1 = −1, the instrument causes those children of type H to receive more schooling (“switching-
in”), while causing those children of type L to actually receive less schooling (“switching-out”). If
βH
2  = βL
2 , this model is an example of what Heckman et al. (2006) call essential heterogeneity with
sorting on the gain. Essential heterogeneity is the key feature of the model driving this example:
speciﬁcally, that the types for which the treatment eﬀects βτ
2 are heterogeneous, H and L, are the




Figure 1 helps to illustrate that in this case the latent index in Equation 7 and the treatment
assignment rule given by Equation 6 yield DH(1) = 1 and DH(0) = 0, while DL(1) = −1 and
DL(0) = 0. Thus for children of type H, DH(1) > DH(0), while for children of type L, DL(1) <
DL(0), in violation of Assumption 2c. The result of this violation of the monotonicity assumption
is that Equation 8 becomes a weighted average of the eﬀect of receiving more schooling for those
of type H (βH
2 ) and the eﬀect of receiving less schooling for those of type L (βL
1 ):
E[Yi|z = 1] − E[Yi|z = 0] = Pr(τ = H)
 
E[Y H




+ Pr(τ = L)
 
E[Y L
i |S0 − 0.25] − E[Y L
i |S0]
 
= Pr(τ = H)βH
2 + Pr(τ = L)βL
1 .
9Equations 8 and 9 have very diﬀerent interpretations, which raises two empirical questions.
First, is redshirting common? If redshirting is not a prevalent phenomenon, then Pr(τ = L) is
small, resulting in only minor biases to the LATE or ACR parameter when using date of birth
as an instrument for educational attainment. Second, are redshirting decisions diﬀerent for those
with diﬀerent eﬀects of educational attainment? That is, is it empirically true that for types
τ ∈ {H,L} for which γH
1 = 1, γL = −1, and Equation 7 accurately describe the redshirting
decision, βH
2  = βL
2 ? If this is not the case, then the model of essential heterogeneity just presented
is possibly inappropriate.
The next Section presents empirical evidence that redshirting is prevalent and that it is ap-
propriate to apply the speciﬁed model of essential heterogeneity to the process of redshirting in
the data set examined. Together with the theoretical considerations just presented, this empirical
evidence complicates the interpretation estimates of the LATE or ACR of educational attainment
obtained when using date of birth as an instrument for educational attainment. A detailed example
illustrating these complications is considered in Section 6.
5 Empirical Evidence Regarding the Violation of Monotonicity
5.1 Data
Data are used from the Early Childhood Longitudinal Study, Kindergarten Class of 1998-99
(ECLS-K) data set. The ECLS-K is a nationally representative sample of 22,666 children enrolled
in 1,277 schools who started kindergarten in the fall of 1998. Data were collected during the the fall
and the spring of kindergarten (1998-99), the fall and spring of 1st grade (1999-2000), the spring of
3rd grade (2002), 5th grade (2004), and 8th grade (2007) from the children, their parents/guardians,
teachers, and school administrators.
5.1.1 Variables
Following the terminology in Bedard and Dhuey (2006), we refer to the relative age at which a
child would be observed if they entered kindergarten when ﬁrst eligible as assigned relative age, and
the child’s actual age relative to their school’s cutoﬀ date as observed relative age. Figure 2 shows
this relative age measured in months. For example, consider a child who lives in a state where the
entrance cutoﬀ age is exactly 5 years old at the start of the school year. Then a child who is 5
years and 3 months old at the start of the school year when ﬁrst eligible to enroll is in the relative
age group M4. If the child redshirts they will join M16, and they will be in M−9 if they enter early.
Note that only in group M4 will the child’s assigned relative age agree with their observed relative
age.
In order to assign children in the ECLS-K to these relative age cohorts, the ECLS-K public
data ﬁle was used to obtain data on respondents’ exact birth date, as well as school-level entrance
cutoﬀ dates. All variables represented as calendar dates were ﬁrst converted to a daily time line in
which day 1 is January 1, 1990. After all time-related variables were ﬁrst constructed using this
10time line, these daily variables were divided by 365 to create annual variables. The yearly variables
were then multiplied by 12 in order to create variables measured in months. A child’s relative age
(RA) is constructed as the age (in months) at the cutoﬀ date minus 60. These data are discussed
in greater depth in Aliprantis (2010).
5.2 Empirical Evidence that Redshirting is Prevalent
Table 1 shows the distribution of observations in the ECLS-K in each relative age group when
using school-level entrance cutoﬀ dates, including children repeating kindergarten. Table 2 shows
the same data, but for the sample including only ﬁrst-time kindergarteners. If we assume parents’
decision rule for determining observed entry age does not change over time, cutoﬀ dates stayed
the same between 1997 and 1998, and that any seasonal patterns in number of births are repeated
every year, then we may use Tables 1 and 2 to estimate the percentage of children in each relative
age group who enter early, when ﬁrst eligible, or after redshirting. These estimates are presented
in Tables 1 and 2. Tables 3 and 4 show these estimates aggregated to the level of quarters.
Examining Tables 2 and 4, note that 27% of children who turned 5 within one month of their
school’s cutoﬀ date are redshirted, as are 19% of children who turned 5 within one quarter of their
school’s cutoﬀ date. The percent of children delayed in school by month and quarter rises to 31%
and 23%, respectively, if we include children who are held back after starting school (Tables 1 and
3). These ﬁgures suggest that the scenario described in Section 4.2 is empirically large, with a
conservative estimate of Pr(τ = L) being 0.19. That is, Equation 9 becomes:
E[Yi|z = 1] − E[Yi|z = 0] = 0.81βH
2 + 0.19βL
1 .
An alternative presentation of these data is given in Figure 3, which follows the assumptions
discussed in Section 4 and uses the data from Table 3 to show the cumulative distribution functions
(CDFs) of S given Z=1 and Z=0 for the cohort of children ﬁrst eligible to begin kindergarten in the
fall of 1998. Note that these CDFs cross, in contrast to the testable implication of monotonicity
proposed in Angrist and Imbens (1995).
5.3 Empirical Evidence of Essential Heterogeneity
To investigate the relationship between redshirting and treatment eﬀect heterogeneity, Tables
5–7 present descriptive statistics of children in the groups from Figure 1: Those in Qb who delayed
enrollment, those in Qa and Qb who enrolled when ﬁrst eligible, and those from Qa who enrolled
before ﬁrst eligible. The ﬁrst column presents these statistics for the entire ECLS-K sample, and
the ﬁnal column presents the P-value of an F-test of the equality of means for children in the 4
groups from Figure 1. We see that the children who delayed enrollment were disproportionately
wealthy, white, male, English-speaking, had better-educated parents and more books at home, and
had never received WIC beneﬁts as an infant or child. It is interesting to note that those who
delayed enrollment also had mothers who worked less, but there was no diﬀerence between the
11employment patterns of fathers by enrollment status. These redshirting patterns are consistent
with those documented in Dobkin and Ferreira (2007) and Deming and Dynarski (2008).
This evidence from the ECLS-K shows that redshirting patterns are diﬀerent for a speciﬁc
group of children, but the model of essential heterogeneity in Section 4.2 requires that redshirters
are aﬀected diﬀerently by educational attainment than other children. Since we never observe the
counterfactual of redshirters entering on time, it is diﬃcult to conceive of conclusive evidence that
there are, or are not, diﬀerences in the eﬀects of educational attainment between redshirters and
non-redshirters. The current evidence on the impacts of redshirting examines outcomes only after
children have been redshirted (Graue and DiPierna (2000)).
However, there is empirical evidence that strongly suggests treatment eﬀect heterogeneity be-
tween redshirters and non-redshirters. First, parents redshirt children based on perceived treatment
eﬀect heterogeneity. Although there is no clear deﬁnition of the word “readiness” (Ackerman and
Barnett (2005)), the fact that parents and schools use some measure of readiness, however imprecise
(Stipek (2002)), means that parents clearly choose to delay there children’s entry into kindergarten
based on perceived heterogeneity in the eﬀects of educational attainment (Graue (1993)). Sec-
ond, there is direct evidence of heterogeneity in the eﬀect of educational attainment on earnings
(Chernozhukov and Hansen (2006)). Finally, there is ample evidence of heterogeneity in the eﬀects
of many educational interventions over the demographic variables characterizing redshirters. For
example, there is evidence that income (Blau (1999)), home inputs such as the number of books at
home (Todd and Wolpin (2007), Aliprantis (2010)), mother’s time at home (Datcher-Loury (1988)),
mother’s educational attainment (Murnane et al. (1981)), maternal employment (Bernal and Keane
(2010)), gender (Dee (2007), Hastings et al. (2006)) and race (Currie and Thomas (1995), Garces
et al. (2002), Hanushek et al. (2004), Dee (2004b), Krueger (1999)) all play important roles in the
eﬀects of education interventions. While inconclusive, this empirical evidence points in favor of the
model of essential heterogeneity speciﬁed in Section 4.
6 Example: Angrist and Krueger (1991)
Redshirting was likely not prevalent among males in the US born between 1930 and 1959,
the sample studied in Angrist and Krueger (1991) (henceforth AK).7 However, AK introduces the
seminal framework for the instrument being discussed, and understanding how redshirting would
have aﬀected its estimates helps to illustrate the problems redshirting creates for newer samples
in which redshirting is prevalent. Consider the Wald estimates obtained in AK. Let Y be log
weekly wages, Z is being born in the quarter either before (Z = 1) or after (Z = 0) the entrance
cutoﬀ date, and D is treatment intensity.8 D is now deﬁned more generally than in Section 4 as
educational attainment at a given age, and will be used interchangeably with schooling attainment
7Considerations related to the diﬀusion of public kindergarten in the US (Cascio (2009), Deming and Dynarski
(2008)) may be more relevant to the sample in AK.
8We abstract from the fact that in AK the value Z = 1 actually indicates a birth date in any of the ﬁrst three
quarters before the cutoﬀ date.
12S. AK estimate E[D(1) − D(0)] = 0.1256 and E[Y |Z = 1] − E[Y |Z = 0] = 0.00898 to obtain a
Wald estimate from Equation 3 of 0.0715. Thus the year of schooling obtained for no other reason
than compulsory schooling laws causally increased weekly wages for males in the sample by 7%.
6.1 The Case of a Strong Instrument
Suppose that everyone responds to the laws used as an instrument. This is not necessarily
realistic in the case of AK, as it implies that everyone would drop out at the age when ﬁrst eligible.
However this is a more realistic assumption if the instrument is only entrance cutoﬀ dates and the
outcome of interest is measured at a given age for all individuals. Returning to the latent index in
Section 4, consider what happens if 20% of children are redshirted, being of type τ = L. In this
case Y follows a mixture distribution
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Combining Equations 10 and 11 yields the following Wald estimator:






It is not clear a priori what parameters from the model in Section 4 we are most interested
in estimating. Regardless, Equation 12 shows that the given identiﬁcation framework leaves all of
them unidentiﬁed. Moreover, fundamentally diﬀerent values of these parameters yield the same
value for the Wald estimator. Figure 4 illustrates the set {(βH
2 ,βH
1 )} solving Equation 12 when the
Wald estimator takes the value obtained in Table III of AK using 1970 Census data, 0.0715, as well
using the 1980 Census data, 0.1020. Examining the results from the 1970 Census data, it could be
the case that increasing schooling by 0.75 years increases the wages of type H individuals by 10%,
but decreasing schooling by only one quarter of a year decreases the wages of type L individuals
by a dramatic 21% (βH
2 = 0.10,βL
1 = −0.21). At the same time, if increasing schooling by 0.75
years increases type H wages by 3.5%, then type L individuals who receive 0.25 years less schooling
actually have wages that are higher by 5% (βH
2 = 0.035,βL
1 = 0.053). Thus the Wald estimates are
not informative about the parameters of our model.
136.2 The Case of a Weak Instrument
The problems created by redshirting are even worse if compulsory schooling laws are a weak
instrument. This is a more realistic assumption in the case of laws that prohibit individuals from
dropping out of school, and it is one of the main criticisms of AK (Bound et al. (1995), Cruz and
Moreira (2005)).9 In this case we do not know the share of type H individuals aﬀected by the
instrument (pH) or the analogous share of type L individuals (pL). If πH denotes the percent of
those overall eﬀected by the instrument who are of type H, then:
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Similar arguments hold for E[D|Z = 1] − E[D|Z = 0] to obtain:






Our problem has grown from one equation with two unknowns to one equation with four unknowns!
Again, there are many conceivable values of {βH
2 ,βL
1 ,πH,πL} solving Equation 13 for the value of
  βWald obtained in AK, many of which carry quite diﬀerent interpretations of how educational
attainment eﬀects wages. The complications introduced by redshirting make the Wald estimates
all but impossible to interpret, so that “biased” is not an accurate label for estimates obtained in
this scenario. In our example we are simply unable to identify treatment parameters due to the
breakdown in the IV framework.
6.3 Implications for the Literature
The preceding example illustrates that parameters of interest may be unidentiﬁed when quarter
or date of birth is used as an instrument for educational attainment. The implications of redshirting
for parameter estimates in the literature will depend on the nature of redshirting in the sample being
9AK estimate that for men born between 1920 and 1929, E[D|Z = 1] − E[D|Z = 0] = 0.1256
14studied, as well as the exact way redshirting interacts with the compulsory schooling laws being
used. Nevertheless, there is a large literature for which redshirting might be a relevant concern, as
compulsory schooling laws have been used to estimate a wide range of parameters. A sample of these
parameters includes the eﬀects of schooling on AFQT scores (Neal and Johnson (1996), Cascio and
Lewis (2006)), civic participation (Dee (2004a), Milligan et al. (2004)), criminal activity (Lochner
and Moretti (2004)), mortality (Lleras-Muney (2005)), happiness (Oreopoulos (2007)), and general
health outcomes (Adams (2002)); the eﬀects of maternal education on infant health (McCrary
and Royer (2009)) and fertility decisions (Black et al. (2004)); the eﬀect of parents’ educational
attainment on children’s educational outcomes (Oreopoulos et al. (2006)); the magnitude of human
capital externalities (Acemoglu and Angrist (2000)); and the eﬀects of kindergarten entrance age
on educational outcomes (Bedard and Dhuey (2006), Datar (2006), Elder and Lubotsky (2008) and
McEwan and Shapiro (2008)). It should also be noted that although the Regression Discontinuity
Designs (RDDs) discussed in the literature such as Hahn et al. (2001) and Imbens and Lemieux
(2008) are for binary treatments, redshirting has implications for the appropriate application of
RDDs.
7 Conclusion
Beginning with the seminal work of Angrist and Krueger (1991), a wide literature has sought
to estimate the eﬀects of educational attainment using quarter or date of birth as an instrument
for educational attainment. In this paper we have provided theoretical and empirical evidence that
parents delaying their children’s initial enrollment in kindergarten, a practice known as redshirting,
makes it all but impossible to interpret estimates of the eﬀects of educational attainment using this
identiﬁcation framework. Theoretical evidence is presented that redshirting creates violations of the
monotonicity assumption necessary to identify many of the causal eﬀects of educational attainment
estimated in the literature. Empirical evidence from the Early Childhood Longitudinal Study,
Kindergarten Class of 1998-99 (ECLS-K) data set demonstrated that redshirting is common, and
that a model of essential heterogeneity is likely appropriate for the redshirting decisions of children
in the ECLS-K.
The result presented in this paper contributes to the wider discussions about the role of theory
in empirical microeconomics, as well as the relationship between econometrics and statistics. More
speciﬁcally, a careful investigation of the complications introduced by redshirting showed that
estimates of the eﬀect of educational attainment may become all but impossible to interpret in
a model of essential heterogeneity. This scenario resulted in a breakdown of the IV framework
in which we were simply unable to identify treatment parameters. This ﬁnding has important
implications for the literature using date of birth as an instrument for the LATE or ACR of
educational attainment.
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Table 1: Cohorts of the ECLS-K (By Month)
(a) All Children
Cohort
Cohort M−1 M−2 M−3 M−4 M−5 M−6 M−7 M−8 M−9 M−10 M−11 M−12
n 57 15 9 6 4 3 7 5 1 3 1 0
Cohort M12 M11 M10 M9 M8 M7 M6 M5 M4 M3 M2 M1
n 954 937 1,003 982 907 962 990 982 946 922 832 802
Cohort M24 M23 M22 M21 M20 M19 M18 M17 M16 M15 M14 M13
n 38 55 60 69 65 82 83 125 155 196 223 361
(b) All Children
Month Before Cutoﬀ Turned 5
Entering 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Early (%) 5.4 1.5 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.3 0.6 0.4 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.0
On-Time (%) 90.9 93.0 93.6 92.9 92.9 91.9 91.7 88.3 85.8 82.2 78.8 69.0
Waiting (%) 3.6 5.5 5.6 6.5 6.7 7.8 7.7 11.2 14.1 17.5 21.1 31.0
Table 2: Cohorts of the ECLS-K (By Month)
(a) First Time Kindergarteners Only
Cohort
Cohort M−1 M−2 M−3 M−4 M−5 M−6 M−7 M−8 M−9 M−10 M−11 M−12
n 45 12 6 3 3 2 3 2 1 1 1 0
Cohort M12 M11 M10 M9 M8 M7 M6 M5 M4 M3 M2 M1
n 790 780 857 838 790 855 854 857 842 798 738 698
Cohort M24 M23 M22 M21 M20 M19 M18 M17 M16 M15 M14 M13
n 31 43 47 49 47 64 49 86 100 121 149 254
(b) First Time Kindergarteners Only
Month Before Cutoﬀ Turned 5
Entering 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Early (%) 5.2 1.4 0.7 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0
On-Time (%) 91.2 93.4 94.2 94.2 94.0 92.8 94.3 90.7 89.3 86.7 83.1 73.3
Waiting (%) 3.6 5.1 5.2 5.5 5.6 6.9 5.4 9.1 10.6 13.2 16.8 26.7
25Table 3: Cohorts of the ECLS-K (By Quarter)
(a) All Children
Quarter Before Cutoﬀ Turned 5
Quarter 4 3 2 1
Early (n) 81 13 13 4
On-Time (n) 2,894 2,851 2,918 2,556
Waiting (n) 153 216 363 780
(b) All Children
Quarter Before Cutoﬀ Turned 5
Entering 4 3 2 1
Early (%) 2.59 0.42 0.39 0.12
On-Time (%) 92.52 92.56 88.59 76.53
Waiting (%) 4.89 7.01 11.02 23.35
Table 4: Cohorts of the ECLS-K (By Quarter)
(a) First-Time Kindergarteners Only
Quarter Before Cutoﬀ Turned 5
Quarter 4 3 2 1
Early (n) 63 8 6 2
On-Time (n) 2,427 2,483 2,553 2,234
Waiting (n) 121 160 235 524
(b) First-Time Kindergarteners Only
Quarter Before Cutoﬀ Turned 5
Entering 4 3 2 1
Early (%) 2.41 0.30 0.21 0.07
On-Time (%) 92.95 93.66 91.37 80.94
Waiting (%) 4.63 6.04 8.41 18.99
26Table 5: Race
The Composition of Cohorts by Race (in %)
Late On-Time Early
Race ECLS-K Qb Qa Qb Qa P-Value
White, Non-Hispanic 62.3 83.3 61.8 58.6 60.3 0.00
Black, Non-Hispanic 11.9 3.3 12.3 13.1 12.7 0.00
Hispanic 14.7 7.3 14.6 16.3 7.9 0.00
Asian 6.4 2.1 6.7 6.9 14.3 0.00
n 10,319 425 2,414 2,234 63
Table 6: Gender
The Composition of Cohorts by Gender in %
Late On-Time Early
Gender ECLS-K Qb Qa Qb Qa P-Value
Female 49.6 36.9 49.9 52.3 73.0 0.00
Male 50.4 63.1 50.1 47.7 27.0 0.00
Table 7: Household Characteristics
Household Characteristics, by Mean and %
Late On-Time Early
Gender ECLS-K Qb Qa Qb Qa P-Value
Number of Books at Home 77.2 94.6 75.4 74.2 71.2 0.00
Household Income ($) 53,595 62,110 52,841 52,961 66,097 0.00
Mother Works ≥ 35 hrs/wk (%) 45.5 36.9 45.7 45.8 59.3 0.00
Father Works ≥ 35 hrs/wk (%) 91.4 90.9 91.0 90.3 92.7 0.85
Mother HDR < HS Diploma (%) 10.8 4.5 11.7 11.8 12.1 0.00
Father HDR < HS Diploma (%) 11.3 4.8 12.2 11.7 15.1 0.00
Mother HDR < BA (%) 74.1 62.4 75.6 75.3 69.0 0.00
Father HDR < BA (%) 68.8 56.6 70.4 70.6 58.5 0.00
Home Language Not English (%) 10.9 3.5 10.8 11.9 12.7 0.00
Child Ever Receive WIC Beneﬁts (%) 41.8 24.0 41.9 44.5 38.1 0.00
27